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ANTITRUST BY ALGORITHM 
 
Cary Coglianese* & Alicia Lai** 
 
 
Technological innovation is changing private markets around the world. New 
advances in digital technology have created new opportunities for subtle and 
evasive forms of anticompetitive behavior by private firms. But some of these 
same technological advances could also help antitrust regulators improve their 
performance. We foresee that the growing digital complexity of the marketplace 
will necessitate that antitrust authorities increasingly rely on machine-learning 
algorithms to oversee market behavior. In making this transition, authorities will 
need to meet several key institutional challenges—building organizational 
capacity, avoiding legal pitfalls, and establishing public trust—to ensure 




Markets are changing around the world. Technological innovation produces a 
steady stream of new products and services that are disrupting old patterns of economic 
activity and delivering new value to consumers. At the same time, many of these 
technologies are also creating new opportunities for rent-seeking behavior by firms. With 
the rapid pace of innovation, the rise of a small number of big technology firms, and the 
creation of new ways for companies to collude and evade regulators, the nature of antitrust 
law and its enforcement will also surely change in the years ahead. Rapid changes in the 
marketplace bring with them increases in public clamoring and calls for legislative action 
to rein in big tech firms. These developments also present regulators with new reasons to 
explore using new technologies innovations to enhance their own performance in 
overseeing private market activity. 
We cannot forecast exactly what direction the substance of antitrust law will take 
in the years to come, nor do we make a normative case here for what that substantive 
direction should take. But we can foresee a shift in antitrust regulators own use of 
technology, and we articulate here why antitrust regulators can and should do more to 
expand their reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) tools to undertake their work.1 Simply 
put, we argue that to keep pace with the changing technologically advanced market 
landscape, antitrust authorities need to enhance their internal capacities both to monitor 
and analyze markets with speed and accuracy and to identify potential regulatory violations 
 
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  
** Judicial Law Clerk at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  
We are grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from Michal Gal, Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Giovanna Massarotto, and Emma Ronzetti. The opinions set forth in this article are solely those 
of the authors and do not represent the views of any other person or institution. This paper is forthcoming in 
the Stanford Journal of Computational Antitrust. 
1  Thibault Schrepel, Computational Antitrust: An Introduction and Research Agenda, 1 STAN. J. 
COMPUTATIONAL ANTITRUST 1 (2021). 
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in need of investigatory scrutiny.2 In the years ahead, antitrust regulators will increasingly 
turn to what we might call antitrust by algorithm. 
We begin in Part I by highlighting how digital technologies, including advances in 
the use of sophisticated algorithms, have created new opportunities for subtle and evasive 
forms of anticompetitive behavior by private firms. In Part II, we show how the growing 
digital complexity of the private marketplace will lead antitrust regulators to rely on many 
of the same kinds of technologies as private firms do—but instead to advance regulatory 
purposes, such as detecting anticompetitive behavior and allocating limited enforcement 
resources. We conclude in Part III that successfully pursuing antitrust by algorithm will 
require that antitrust regulators confront key institutional challenges in the years ahead, 
building up their technological and human capital to ensure that they use algorithmic tools 
effectively in ways that avoid legal vulnerabilities and that ensure public trust and 
confidence in these tools. 
 
I. ANTITRUST IN AN ALGORITHMIC MARKETPLACE 
 
For many decades after the enactment of major antitrust laws in the United States 
and other major economies, it appeared that regulatory organizations could oversee the 
pace of change in the economic marketplace if they simply hired more staff members. 
Indeed, the most well-regarded antitrust authorities around the world also tend to be the 
largest.3 
But in recent years, the nature and pace of change in marketplaces around the world 
has dramatically shifted to a point where simply hiring more experts may not be enough. 
Markets have transformed along many dimensions. E-commerce, for example, has become 
a mainstay within the retail marketplace. Firms have increasingly adopted automated 
systems to set prices and track business transactions. Market conduct has become 
progressively complex and rapidly changing, and markets have become increasingly more 
networked and collaborative.4 Although antitrust officials have long sought to rely on 
careful, sophisticated analysis of competition and consumer welfare, now they must seek 
to fulfill their responsibilities in the face of firm behavior that can fluctuate rapidly and 
 
2 A similar argument, but for regulators more generally, can be found in Cary Coglianese, Optimizing 
Regulation for the Optimizing Economy, 4 J. PUB. AFFRS. 1 (2018). 
3  As the authors of a widely known ranking system of antitrust regulators around the world has 
acknowledged, “the bigger a government’s competition budget, the better the enforcement agency gets.” 
Global Competition Review, Rating Enforcement 2015 (June 18, 2015). The Federal Trade Commission in 
the United States has about 600 personnel devoted to antitrust matters. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2022, 49 (2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/fy-2022-congressional-budget-justification/fy22cbj.pdf. The U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division comprises about 750 staff members. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Cong. 
Submission FY 2022 Performance Budget, 54 (2021), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1398291/ 
download. And the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition has about 850 personnel. 
Eur. Comm’n, H.R. Key Figures (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/european-commission-
hr_key_figures_2021_en.pdf. 
4 Herbert Hovenkamp, Monopolizing and the Sherman Act (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3963245. 
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subtly through algorithms, such as with the use of finely differentiated pricing, digital 
transactions, and new forms of industrial organization.5 
In this new marketplace emerging around the world, firms in the private sector are 
conducting a greater number of transactions with more complex structures. An upwards 
global trend has arisen in the number of mergers and acquisitions across an array of sectors, 
including pharmaceuticals, media and entertainment, and digital services. 6  Firms, 
universities, and startups are all entering more technology transfer agreements. 7  In 
addition, studies report an increase in deal complexity as firms hunt for ways to create 
value in a crowded market.8 Agreements now often involve carve-outs, scale deals, and 
capability-driven investments, such as the acquisition by technology firms of cloud-based, 
mobile, online, and big data technologies.9 And the day-to-day operation of these firms 
often relies heavily on data processing, such as with real-time processing of marketplace 
factors, automated tracking of supply chains, and collection of massive amounts of data on 
consumer preferences. Overall, in an economy increasingly driven by data analysis, access 
to and control over data correspondingly becomes an increasing potential source of market 
power.10  
One example of the changing landscape that has potential antitrust implications can 
be found with the growing reliance on firms’ dynamic pricing algorithms. Dynamic pricing 
refers to a set of pricing strategies aimed at increasing profits by adjusting the set price 
according to changing variables in supply and demand.11 When a product has limited 
capacity and an expiration date, technology now allows a firm, with relative ease, to make 
larger swings in prices while still being assured of the sale.12  
 
5 These changes in the marketplace would only seem to reinforce the need for sound analysis to fulfill 
what Herb Hovenkamp calls “the first rule of rational antitrust policy: figure out who is getting hurt, and 
how.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 489, 544 (2021). 
6 Jennifer Rudden, Number of Merger and Acquisition Deals Worldwide 1985–2021, STATISTA (June 18, 
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/267368/number-of-mergers-and-acquisitions-worldwide-since-2005/; 
Anne Sraders, M&A Activity Has Already Blown Past the $2 Trillion Mark in a Record-Breaking 2021, 
FORTUNE (June 2, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/06/02/mergers-acquisitions-2021-m-and-a-record-year-
spacs/; Orla McCaffrey, Bank Mergers are on Track to Hit Their Highest Level Since the Financial Crisis, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-mergers-are-on-track-to-hit-
their-highest-level-since-the-financial-crisis-11632793461. 
7 Dipanjan Nag, Antara Gupta & Alex Turo, The Evolution of University Technology Transfer: By the 
Numbers, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/07/evolution-university-
technology-transfer/id=120451/. 
8 FINANCIER WORLDWIDE MAGAZINE, Increasingly Complex M&A in the Technology Sector Puts the 
Spotlight on Effective Due Diligence to Drive Success (June 2014), https://www.financierworldwide.com/ 
increasingly-complex-ma-in-the-technology-sector-puts-the-spotlight-on-effective-due-diligence. 
9 Id. 
10  Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67 (2019); Cristian 
Santesteban & Shayne Longpre, How Big Data Confers Market Power to Big Tech: Leveraging the 
Perspective of Data Science, 65 ANTITRUST BULL. 459 (2020). 
11 Kaveh Waddell, The Death of Prices, AXIOS (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.axios.com/future-of-retail-
amazon-surge-pricing-brick-and-mortar-b6a5f9fe-130f-4601-b96f-a3dc7a69b54e.html (with dynamic 
pricing systems, “prices that are constantly changing, either by time of day or by individual or by 
demographic type”) (quoting Scott Turow). See also R. Preston McAfee & Vera te Velde, Dynamic Pricing 




Dynamic pricing strategies were introduced by American Airlines in the 1980s and 
depended upon the company’s internal management system that tracked route demand, 
number of seats, and other factors.13 These strategies reportedly yielded American Airlines 
an extra $500 million per year.14 They also offered the potential to yield significant gains 
in consumer welfare. In the context of airline prices, evidence indicates that consumers 
benefit overall when leisure travelers who make reservations in advance receive lower 
prices than business travelers who make last-minute reservations. 15  Yet this may not 
always be so in every industry. 
With the advancement of e-commerce and digital technology, a wider array of firms 
can use dynamic pricing strategies in real time.16 Moreover, perfect price discrimination, 
which was long viewed as impossible, is now increasingly possible to approximate.17 In 
the past, traditional retailers were often constrained by lack of data on supply and demand, 
as well as simple physical limitations associated with the need for manually relabeling 
prices on products. But today, e-commerce retailers can easily gather data on competitors’ 
prices as well as other variables and then effortlessly modify prices of their products 
numerous times per day.18 One study found that the price of products sold by firms using 
dynamic pricing algorithms fluctuated 10 times more than human-priced products, and that 
firms using dynamic pricing algorithms accounted for one-third of the best-selling products 
sold by third parties on Amazon.19  
Dynamic pricing algorithms extend beyond e-commerce retailers. Uber employs a 
similar price-surging algorithm to set the price of a rideshare according to real-time factors 
such as available drivers and demand for rides.20 In times of bad weather or at rush hour, 
for instance, ride fares will be subject to a fare multiplier. Uber defends the practice as 
merely adjusting for supply and demand to avoid long wait times and promote ride 
completion rates.21 But even if an ordinary auction market would clear the same way—that 
is, increase price as buyers increased—the use of an algorithm allows for real-time, rapid, 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Kevin Williams, The Welfare Effects of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Airline Markets (Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2103, 2021). 
16 Le Chen, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson, An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon 
Marketplace, PROC. OF THE 25TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB (2016), 
http://www.ccs. neu.edu/home/amislove/publications/Amazon-WWW.pdf. 
17 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Price Discrimination 
(Oct. 13, 2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)15/en/pdf; Axel Gautier, Ashwin Ittoo & 
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, AI Algorithms, Price Discrimination and Collusion: A Technological, Economic 
and Legal Perspective, EUROPEAN J.L. & ECON. (2020). 
18 Chen, Mislove & Wilson, supra note 16, at 1, 9; Xuesong Zhao, Big Data and Price Discrimination, 
2020 IEEE 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CLOUD COMPUTING AND BIG DATA ANALYTICS (May 19, 
2020), https://ieeexplore-ieee-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/document/9095721. 
19 Id. See also Matthew Ridings & Mark Butscha, Algorithms and Antitrust Law: The Only Winning 
Move is Not to Play, THOMPSON HINE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.doescrimepay.com/2020/10/algorithms-
and-antitrust-law-the-only-winning-move-is-not-to-play/#_ftn7. 
20  UBER, How Surge Pricing Works, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/driver-app/how-surge-works/ 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021). Some even allege that Uber’s surge pricing will account for low battery to 
increase your fare. Jessica Lindsay, Does Uber Charge More if Your Battery is Lower?, METRO (Sept. 27, 
2019), https://metro.co.uk/2019/09/27/uber-charge-battery-lower-10778303/. 
21 Jonathan Hall, Cory Kendrick & Chris Nosko, The Effects of Uber’s Surge Pricing: A Case Study, 
UBER (2015), https://eng.uber.com/research/the-effects-of-ubers-surge-pricing-a-case-study/.  
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and perfect price discrimination. And even if algorithmic systems can adjust prices for 
legitimate reasons, they also allow new possibilities for anticompetitive behavior. In fact, 
Uber has already been sued for alleged antitrust violations.22 In 2015, Uber was charged 
with allegations that its price-surging algorithm created an anticompetitive conspiracy 
between Uber and its drivers because each driver had expressly agreed with Uber to charge 
certain fares “with the clear understanding that all other Uber drivers are agreeing to charge 
the same fares.” 23  With advancements in the sophistication and reach of smartphone 
technology and ridesharing applications, Uber has been able to coordinate agreements 
between “hundreds of thousands of drivers in far-flung locations” despite the fact that none 
of the drivers had communicated directly with one another.24 Although the arbitrator in the 
lawsuit ultimately decided in favor of Uber due to a lack of evidence of agreements among 
drivers to work for the same price,25 what the district court judge wrote in that case aptly 
describes the challenge for antitrust today and into the future: “The advancement of 
technological means for the orchestration of large-scale price fixing-conspiracies need not 
leave antitrust law behind.”26 
Such automation via price-setting models, along with increasing access to 
comprehensive market information, introduces new challenges into the work of antitrust 
regulators. Algorithmic price-setting opens the door to a series of both intentional and 
unintentional market distortions.27 It also opens the door to possible cases of algorithmic 
collusion that could be difficult to detect.28 Algorithmically facilitated anticompetitive 
conduct in multi-firm interactions may not always be detectable through traditional means.  
In some cases, interactions between dynamic pricing algorithms may lead to 
obviously absurd results. For example, two booksellers that both employed Amazon’s 
dynamic pricing algorithm ended up pushing the price of a used textbook to nearly $24 
million.29 But in other cases, pricing algorithms may facilitate less dramatic but no less real 
collusive price-fixing strategies. In 2015, for instance, a Californian poster and framed art 
dealer pleaded guilty to coordinating with other art dealers to using price-fixing algorithms 
to set the price of artworks on Amazon.30 In that case, the defendant apparently used the 
 
22 Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 820, 822–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
23 Id. at 824. 
24 Id. at 825. 
25 Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-2750, 16-2752 (2d Cir. 2017). 
26 Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d, at 826 (citing United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (“[I]f there were an automated telephone line that offered others the opportunity to gather together to 
engage in narcotics trafficking by pressing ‘1,’ this would surely be powerful evidence of the button-pusher's 
agreement to enter the conspiracy. Automation is effected through a human design; here, Ulbricht is alleged 
to have been the designer of Silk Road.”). 
27 Chen, Mislove & Wilson, supra note 16, at 10.  
28  Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Personalized Pricing in the Digital Era (Nov. 28, 2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2018)13&docLang
uage=En. See also Peter Cohen, Robert Hahn & Jonathan Hall, Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: 
The Case of Uber (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ 
ftc-2018-0048-d-0124-155312.pdf.  
29 Olivia Solon, How a Book About Flies Came to be Priced $24 Million on Amazon, WIRED (Apr. 27, 
2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/04/amazon-flies-24-million/. 
30 Dep’t of Justice, Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s 
First Online Marketplace Prosecution (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-
executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace; Plea Agreement, United States 
v. Topkins, CR-15-201 (N.D. Cal. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/628891/download. 
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algorithm as a tool in an intentional scheme to act anticompetitively. Similarly, in 2016, 
the UK Competition and Markets Authority determined that two competing sellers of 
licensed sports and entertainment posters infringed competition law by agreeing with one 
another that they would not undercut each other’s prices for posters sold on Amazon’s UK 
website—and then using automated pricing software to effectuate that agreement.31 In 
2018, the European Commission sanctioned four electronics manufacturers for price-fixing 
in the consumer retail market.32 The manufacturers had used a digital algorithm to monitor 
retailers’ pricing to ensure it met the minimum in their scheme; in turn, the retailers used 
an automated pricing system to match their competitors’ prices.33 
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that the use of algorithms for setting prices 
will or should be inherently suspect. Our point is simply that the increasing complexity of 
business behavior and its reliance on sophisticated digital technology is likely to make the 
antitrust regulator’s task correspondingly complex, such that the government would benefit 
from the use of digital technology too.34 Pricing algorithms represent only one private 
sector use of new algorithmic tools. Businesses may also be able to leverage algorithms in 
other creative but anticompetitive ways. For instance, just as multiple businesses might 
agree to no-poach agreements with one another in order to fix compensation at artificially 
low levels, 35  businesses might now use salary algorithms to effectuate similar 
compensation-fixing—and without overt evidence of agreement so long as the companies 
have not agreed with each other on the use of a single algorithm. In addition, much concern 
appears today over ways that algorithms might be used by platform firms to engage in 
subtle forms of self-preferencing behavior, which could well in some cases constitute 
unlawful anticompetitive conduct. 36  Other new non-price forms of anticompetitive 
behavior may arise, such as the prospect of firms using automated natural language 
processing tools to manipulate and fake online consumer reviews in an effort gain 
competitive advantage.37  
Moreover, with autonomously learning algorithms, it may not only be easier for 
business owners and managers to fulfill their anticompetitive intentions and actively 
 
31  Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority (2016), https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/media/57ee7c2740f0b606dc000018/case-50223-final-non-confidential-infringement-decision.pdf; 
see generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Algorithms and Collusion—Note from the United 
Kingdom (2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)19/ en/pdf.  
32 European Commission, Commission Decision of 24.7.2018 relating to proceedings under Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Case AT.40465 - ASUS (July 24, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40465/40465_337_3.pdf; see generally Rob 
Nicholls, Regtech as an Antitrust Enforcement Tool, 9 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 135, 141–42 (2021). 
33 European Commission, supra note 32. 
34 We note, for example, that machine learning has been used successfully to identify when online 
retailers are themselves using algorithms for dynamic pricing. Chen, Mislove & Wilson, supra note 16.  
35 In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
36 See, e.g., Helena Quinn, Kate Brand & Stephan Hunt, Algorithms: Helping Competition Authorities 
Be Cognisant of the Harms, Build Their Capabilities and Act, 3 CONCURRENCES 5, 6 (2021); Daniel Hanley, 
How Self-Preferencing Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Jun. 2021), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/how-self-preferencing-can-violate-section-2-of-the-
sherman-act/; Thomas, Höppner, Maximilian Volmar & Philipp Westerhoff, Online Advertising: The French 
Competition Decision on Google's Self-Preferencing in Ad Tech, CONCURRENCES ECOMPETITITIONS (Sept. 
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3929310 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3929310. 
37 See, e.g., Justin Johnson & D. Daniel Sokol, Understanding AI Collusion and Compliance, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE 881, 889–92 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2021).  
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collude in more subtle ways, but the algorithms themselves may also be able to make 
collusive decisions independently of any human decision-maker. 38  Such unconscious 
collusion may come about, for example, if firms rely on a common intermediary algorithm 
to set prices or if self-learning algorithms interact and learn to collude with one another.39 
From the standpoint of businesses’ managers, algorithmically fostered anticompetitive 
behavior may be completely unconscious, even though its welfare harms would remain just 
as real for consumers.40  
 We have presented what is far from an exhaustive list of ways that algorithms are 
likely to complicate the work of antitrust authorities around the world.41 We have pointed 
to automated pricing systems and the prevalence of other kinds of algorithmic market 
decisionmaking simply to illustrate how innovations in the private use of algorithms are 
likely to present new challenges for competition authorities. 42  Private sector use of 
algorithms in these and other ways will likely make it easier for firms to evade regulators—
or at least will make it harder for regulators to distinguish between legal and illegal 
conduct.43 We do not claim that private sector deployment of algorithms will always or 
 
38 Algorithms’ ability to collude autonomously should not be overstated, nor would such a circumstance 
necessarily constitute an antitrust violation under current law. See, e.g., Podcast: How Pricing Algorithms 
Learn to Collude, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/ 2021/10/27/ 
1038835/podcast-how-pricing-algorithms-learn-to-collude/ (“These self-learning algorithms don’t have 
understanding, much less mutual understanding, which is really what’s required in the context of the law.”) 
(quoting Joseph Harrington); Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion, 14 J. COMP. 
L. & ECON. 568 (2018) (arguing that coordinated and tacitly collusive behavior between algorithms is 
difficult to achieve).  
39 For instance, banks may use algorithms to set their own interest rates relative to benchmark interest 
rates. If numerous banks used the same algorithm with the same objective functions, antitrust law would need 
to determine whether the banks came to an improper agreement or merely made unilateral decisions. ISS 
INSIGHTS, LIBOR-Based Financial Instrument Antitrust Action Settles at $21.775 Million (Sept. 2, 2020), 
https://insights.issgovernance.com/posts/libor-based-financial-instrument-antitrust-action-settles-at-21-775-
million/. 
40 The actual likelihood of such algorithm-derived collusion is currently uncertain and debated in the 
literature. For a concise review of this literature, see Johnson & Sokol, supra note 40, at 883–85. Moreover, 
the extent to which such autonomous collusion is or should be deemed illegal remains under discussion. See, 
e.g., Joseph E. Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents, 14 
J. COMP. L. & ECON. 331 (2018). 
41 For a more comprehensive discussion of potential competitive and consumer harms from businesses’ 
use of algorithms, see Gal, supra note 10, at 77-94, and U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, Algorithms: 
How They Can Reduce Competition and Harm Consumers (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/algorithms-how-they-can-reduce-competition-and-harm-
consumers/algorithms-how-they-can-reduce-competition-and-harm-consumers#contents. 
42 See, e.g., Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolaris, Vincenxo Denicolo & Sergio Pastorello, Artificial 
Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, 110 AMER. ECON. ASSOC. 3267 (2020), 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190623; Stephanie Assad, Robert Clark, Daniel Ershov 
& Lei Xu, Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline 
Market (CESifo Working Paper No. 8521, 2020), https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2020/working-
paper/algorithmic-pricing-and-competition-empirical-evidence-german; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Effect 
of Outsourcing Pricing Algorithms on Market Competition (forthcoming), https://joeharrington5201922. 
github.io/pdf/Outsourcing%20pricing%20algorithms_21.07.19.pdf. 
43 Antitrust regulators’ inherently face challenges in detecting unlawful behavior because “effective 
collusion is clandestine.” William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Serial Collusion by 
Multi-Product Firms, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 296, 298 (2018). But with the ability to make more 
fine-grained decisions, firms’ anti-competitive behavior will likely grow harder for antitrust authorities to 
detect if they fail to enhance their own analytic capacities. For example, it has been suggested that, “[i]f new 
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even often be problematic under existing antitrust law in the United States or elsewhere in 
the world—nor are we taking any position on whether the substance of antitrust law 
necessarily should change in light of these technological developments. Rather, our point 
is that, under nearly any scenario of the future, algorithms will change the conduct of 
business in ways that will likely prompt governmental authorities to see it necessary to 
deploy similar algorithmic tools in overseeing the marketplace.  
  
II. TOWARD ANTITRUST BY ALGORITHM 
 
We thus see a strong case for regulators to become more versed in using the same 
innovative technologies used by private firms.44 Just as algorithmic tools have exacerbated 
the complexity and dynamism of the marketplace and created new challenges for antitrust 
enforcement, these same technological advances may also help antitrust regulators better 
pinpoint potential legal violations.45 The new marketplace will likely put a premium on 
antitrust authorities use of algorithmic tools simply to keep pace with the use of these tools 
by the private sector.46  
Some observers have proposed substantive changes to antitrust law that would 
impose new regulatory responsibilities on dominant firms in the new digital marketplace.47 
Legal authorities around the world have begun to consider legislative and regulatory 
changes that would impose conduct standards and other affirmative obligations on firms’ 
 
technologies make coordinated interaction more likely, competition enforcers will need to focus more on 
coordinated effects in merger analysis at lower market concentration thresholds. . . . [Algorithmic price 
discrimination] may increase the chances that a given merger will harm consumers in some relevant market 
even if the remaining post-merger competition is sufficient to protect the majority of consumers.” Terrell 
McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, The Implications of Algorithmic Pricing for Coordinated Effects Analysis and 
Price Discrimination Markets in Antitrust Enforcement, 32 ANTITRUST 75, 79 (2017). See also Gal, supra 
note 10, at 82 (“[R]eaching a supra-competitive equilibrium by using algorithms operating in our digital 
world can be easier, relative to a similar market operating without algorithms.”). 
44 As Salil Mehra has noted, “as the competition they oversee becomes more complicated, enforcement 
agencies will need to develop increased technical competence to understand new forms of algorithmic 
competition.” Salil K. Mehra, Algorithmic Competition, Collusion, and Price Discrimination, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 205 (Woodrow Barfield, ed., 2021). 
45 See Giovanna Massarotto, Using Tech to Fight Big Tech, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 27, 2021), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/using-tech-to-fight-big-tech (“Government’s adoption of 
emerging technologies would help deepen its understanding in the same technologies that now rely on data, 
and the markets it wants to oversee. The truth is that government could not think of moving fast enough in 
its enforcement action without these adequate resources and tools.”); Quinn, Brand & Hunt, supra note 36, 
at 10 (“As the number and complexity of digital competition cases grow, so too does the need for competition 
agencies to have data and technology skills….Without data and technology skills, including algorithmic skills, 
agencies may struggle to hold dominant technology companies to account.”). 
46 Coglianese, supra note 2, at 2 (“Just as the end of horse-and-buggy days meant that local governments 
needed to purchase cars for police officers to enforce speed limits on the roads, so too must regulatory 
agencies of all kinds adapt and respond to an increasingly technologically advanced society. An ever-
optimizing economy depends on an equally ever-optimizing regulatory system.”). 
47 See, e.g., Gal, supra note 10, at 97 (“‘Smart coordination’ by suppliers requires ‘smart regulation’—
setting rules that limit the harms of increased coordination while ensuring that the digital economy’s welfare-
enhancing effects are not lost.”); Zev Mahari, Robert, Sandro Claudio Lera & Alex Pentland, Time for a New 
Antitrust Era: Refocusing Antitrust Law to Invigorate Competition in the 21st Century, 1 STAN. 
COMPUTATIONAL ANTITRUST 52, 53 (2021) (“To ensure a vibrant and competitive marketplace in the future, 
antitrust regulation must adjust to the unique needs of the 21st century economy.”) 
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use of data and digital tools in an effort to combat anticompetitive tendencies. 48 Some of 
these proposals call for increasing oversight of mergers in the digital sector, establishing 
new agencies dedicated to certain types of tech firms, and scrutinizing innovation and data 
use by dominant firms.49  
Other proposals call for various forms of ex ante conduct regulation, such as 
mandating data sharing for firms with bottleneck power and mandating data mobility and 
open standards for all firms. 50  An amendment to the German Competition Act, for 
example, prohibits self-preferencing by dominant firms and imposes on them affirmative 
obligations of interoperability and data portability.51 It also introduces a new category of 
market power: companies with “paramount significance for competition across markets,” 
which encompasses digital players that have significant influence on certain markets 
without having significant market shares in those markets.52 Dominant firms with financial 
strength and access to data relevant for competition are prohibited from conduct that creates 
self-favoring, impedes competitors by leveraging market power, uses data collected in a 
market in which it is dominant to create or increase barriers to entry in other markets, 
 
48  For recent analyses and proposals from antitrust authorities around the world, see, e.g., U.K. 
COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION (2017), https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_dig
ital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL 
PLATFORMS INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT (2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/digital-platforms-inquiry-
final-report; AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE AND BUNDESKARTELLAMT, ALGORITHMS AND COMPETITION 
(2019), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/algorithms-and-competition.pdf; COMPETI-
TION BUREAU CANADA, BIG DATA AND INNOVATION: KEY THEMES FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN CANADA 
(2018), https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04342.html. See generally ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION: COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2017), http://www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-
policy-in-the-digital-age.htm; JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER, 
COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA (European Comm’n, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf. See also ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & MACHINE LEARNING: 
EMERGING LEGAL AND SELF-REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS, A REPORT BY THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S SECTION OF ANTITRUST: PART ONE (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/antitrust_law/comments/october-2019/clean-antitrust-ai-report-pt1-093019.pdf [herein-
after “ABA PART ONE”]; COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DATA AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING, A REPORT BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST: PART TWO (2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/ 
comments/feb-21/aba-big-data-task-force-white-paper-part-two-final-215.pdf.authcheckdam [hereinafter 
“ABA PART TWO”]. 
49 ABA PART TWO, supra note 48, at 65–66; STIGLER CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND 
THE STATE & UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL 
PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/news-and-media/ 
committee-on-digital-platforms-final-report. 
50 See, e.g., STIGLER CENTER, supra note 49; Press Release, Augmenting Compatibility and Competition 
by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm/2019/10/senators-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-encourage-competition-in-social-media; William P. 
Rogerson & Howard Shelanski, Antitrust Enforcement, Regulation, and Digital Platforms, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 
1911–40 (2020). 
51 German Competition Act, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/; see also FED. MINISTRY OF 
ECON. AFF. & ENERGY, A NEW COMPETITION FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, REPORT BY THE 
COMMISSION ‘COMPETITION LAW 4.0’ (2019), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/ Publikationen/Wirtschaft/a-
new-competition-framework-for-the-digital-economy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. 
52 GIBSON DUNN, “Digitalization Act”: Significant Changes to German Antitrust Rules (Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/digitalization-act-significant-changes-to-german-antitrust-rules/. 
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hinders interoperability and data portability, and provides insufficient information to other 
firms to evaluate its services.53 
Regardless of the precise direction that antitrust law should take in the years 
ahead—a question on which we take no position here—competition regulators will need 
to adapt their operations to respond better to new market conditions and business 
practices.54 Already, regulators in domains other than antitrust are discovering the value of 
big data and machine-learning algorithms for maximizing the impact of their limited 
enforcement resources.55 Digital algorithms are being widely used to answer a perennial 
challenge facing regulators: namely, how to allocate scarce auditing attention optimally 
among millions of transactions and thousands of firms so as to “find the needles in these 
haystacks, with limited staff.”56  For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service uses 
algorithmic tools to detect tax evasion57  and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services use these tools to identify fraud in the health care sector.58 The U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission also now uses machine learning to detect instances of securities 
fraud and insider trading.59 A survey conducted across the U.S. federal government found 
that regulators increasingly use AI tools as a means of setting enforcement priorities—
indeed, enforcement makes up the second largest category of use cases identified in the 
survey.60  
 
53 German Competition Act, supra note 51, at § 18, ¶ 2a–3a, § 20, ¶ 3a. 
54 See Mehra, supra note 44, at 208 (“Antitrust enforcers will have to upgrade their technical skills and 
improve their ability to gauge empirically whether algorithmically driven practices hurt consumers.”). It has 
even been suggested that, if antitrust authorities can improve their enforcement of traditional antitrust law 
using advanced technologies, this may reduce to some degree the need for adopting ex ante regulations. See 
Schrepel, supra note 1, at 13. 
55  Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the 
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Cary Coglianese & Lavi Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication 
and Administration, BROOKLYN L. REV. (forthcoming). 
56 Stefan Hunt, From Maps to Apps: The Power of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence for 
Regulators, BEESLEY LECTURE SERIES ON REGULATORY ECONOMICS (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/documents/from-maps-to-apps.pdf. 
57 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Treasury Announces IRA Integrated Modernization Business 
Plan Promoting Cost Efficiency, Improved Taxpayer Service and Protection (Apr. 18, 2019) (noting 
“software that completes laborious tasks in seconds through automation and artificial intelligence, 
eliminating error-prone manual work and increasing speed and accuracy”); U.S. TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, The Information Reporting and Document Matching Case 
Management System Could Not Be Deployed (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/ 
auditreports/2014reports/201420088fr.pdf; see also Erik Hemberg, Jacob Rosen, Geoff Warner, Sanith 
Wijesinghe & Una-May O'Reilly, Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-Evolution of Tax Evasion Risk 
and Audit Likelihood 79 (2015), https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/taxpaper.pdf; Lynnley Browning, 
Computer Scientists Wield Artificial Intelligence to Battle Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/business/computer-scientists-wield-artificial-intelligence-to-battle-
tax-evasion.html. For a discussion of how other tax authorities are using AI tools, see AI TRENDS, AI Applied 
to Tax Systems Can Help Discover Shelters, Support Equality (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.aitrends.com/ai-
in-government/ai-applied-to-tax-systems-can-help-discover-shelters-support-equality/. 
58  Edward Roche, The Audit Algorithm Arms Race in Medicare, RAC MONITOR (Sept. 2, 2020), 
https://racmonitor.com/the-audit-algorithm-arms-race-in-medicare/. 
59 DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 22–29 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
60 Id. at 17. The largest category was regulatory research, analysis, and monitoring. Id. 
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Algorithmic tools have achieved demonstrable improvements in government 
agencies’ ability to forecast accurately—which has also been the main impetus for 
deploying them in the private sector.61 For example, machine-learning algorithms have 
been found to improve the ability of environmental regulators to detect violations of water 
pollution rules by up to six times that of other methods.62 They have been used by border 
officials in Greece to detect individuals with asymptomatic cases of COVID-19, improving 
the identification of such cases by more than two times conventional screening cases.63 
They have been adopted to help in the detection of violations of fisheries bycatch 
limitations,64 the forecasting of recidivism in bail and parole decisions,65 and choices about 
where to send building inspectors and general police patrols.66 It is not hard to foresee an 
emerging era across government of increasing administrative reliance on “adjudication by 
algorithm” and even “rulemaking by robot.”67  
Although antitrust authorities do not appear to have moved as quickly to adopt AI 
tools as have other regulators,68 they are starting to see value in exploring ways to use the 
same kinds of innovative computational tools that other governmental authorities are 
using.69 The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, for instance, is pursuing the use of 
algorithmic techniques and other efforts “to understand how firms are using data, what 
 
61 For a review of studies showing how machine-learning algorithms can make improvements in the 
performance of governmental tasks, see Cary Coglianese & Alicia Lai, Algorithm vs. Algorithm, DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2022). See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, OLIVIER SIBONY, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NOISE: A FLAW IN 
HUMAN JUDGMENT (2021). 
62 See Miyuki Hino, Elinor Benami & Nina Brooks, Enhancing Environmental Monitoring Through 
Machine Learning, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 583, 583–84 (2018). 
63  See Hamsa Bastini, et al., Efficient and Targeted COVID-19 Border Testing via Reinforcement 
Learning, 599 NATURE 108 (2021). 
64  See Richard Berk, Forecasting Consumer Safety Violations and Violators, in IMPORT SAFETY: 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Coglianese, Finkel, Zaring eds. 2009). 
65 See Richard Berk et al., Forecasting Murder Within a Population of Probationers and Parolees: A 
High Stakes Application of Statistical Learning, 172 J. ROYAL. STAT. SOC’Y SERIES A 191 (2009). 
66 See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 55. 
67 Id.; see also MICHAEL LIVERMORE, LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (2019); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & ARIEL PORAT, PERSONALIZED LAW: DIFFERENT RULES FOR 
DIFFERENT PEOPLE (2021). 
68 See Ai Deng, An Antitrust Lawyer's Guide to Machine Learning, 32 ANTITRUST 82, 82 (2017) (“The 
antitrust community is largely playing catch-up on technical aspects of AI and ML.”) 
69 The U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, for example, has undertaken efforts to “increase 
the division’s capabilities and engagement in emerging technologies relevant to antitrust enforcement.” Dept. 
of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Joins Computational Antitrust Project at Stanford Law School 
(Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-joins-computational-antitrust-project-
stanford-law-school. Similarly, the European Commission has initiated research “on how Artificial 
Intelligence could potentially improve DG Competition’s processes of evidence management, legal drafting, 
and market intelligence gathering.” European Commission, Ex-ante publicity on low and middle value 
contracts, https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/single-market-programme-smp/calls-tenders-contracts/ 
ex-ante-publicity-low-and-middle-value_en (last visited Nov. 1, 2021). In the Netherlands, authorities have 
developed a predictive analytics tool to identify sectors with potential market concentration problems. Lilian 
Petit, The Economic Detection Instrument of the Netherlands Competition Authority: The Competition Index 
(NMa Working Paper, 2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1992774. 
 12 
their machine learning (ML) and AI algorithms are doing, the consequences of these 
algorithms and, ultimately, what actions authorities need to take.”70  
Interest in algorithmic tools is also growing among antitrust legal scholars who are 
identifying possible ways to supplement—or even at times supplant—traditional 
approaches to antitrust regulation and enforcement through the use of AI and blockchain 
technologies. Thibault Schrepel, for example, has issued what can be considered a 
manifesto for antitrust by algorithm, arguing that, as “markets are becoming increasingly 
complex and dynamic in today’s economy[, t]his complicates the task of antitrust agencies, 
each day a little more.” 71  Schrepel explains that, “[a]gainst this background, the 
implementation of computational methods is becoming necessary to maintain and improve 
antitrust agencies’ ability to detect, analyze, and remedy anticompetitive practices.”72 He 
specifically points to the potential for new digital technologies to enable antitrust regulators 
to process vast quantities of data and large volumes of text more quickly and more 
effectively.73 He also argues that advances in information technology and data analytics 
may make possible substantial improvements to real-time, dynamic analyses of mergers.74 
 The growing interest by legal scholars in the use of AI tools for antitrust parallels an 
increasing recognition by economists in the value of using more sophisticated, dynamic 
analysis to assess market competitiveness and to identify rent-seeking behavior. 75 
Economists have relied on machine learning to help enhance their market analyses, whether 
in estimating counterfactuals or solving dynamic games. 76  Of course, even with an 
increasing recognition of how machine learning can improve economic analysis, 
economists and government regulators will not find that every question can be answered 
best by machine learning.77 Analyses of well-studied sectors can be, and likely will still be, 
best approached using other analytic techniques.78 Moreover, data limitations will prove 
an impediment to the use of machine-learning algorithms in many contexts.  
 
70 U.K. Competition & Markets Authority, CMA’s new DaTA unit: exciting opportunities for data 
scientists (Oct. 24, 2018), https://competitionandmarkets.blog.gov.uk/2018/10/24/cmas-new-data-unit-
exciting-opportunities-for-data-scientists/. 
71 Schrepel, supra note 1, at 4. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 5–7. 
74 Id. at 8–9. 
75  For decades, economists have recognized the need for dynamic modeling of firms’ competitive 
behavior. Victor Aguirregabiria & Aviv Nevo, Recent Developments in Empirical IO: Dynamic Demand and 
Dynamic Games, 3 ECONOMETRICS 1 (2013). Economists are increasingly exploring the role that machine 
learning can play in such dynamic analysis. Victor Aguirregabiria, Allan Collard-Wexler & Stephen P. Ryan, 
Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization (Working Paper, Sept. 3, 2021), https://www. 
economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-706.pdf.  
76  Hal Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2014); Sendhil 
Mullainathan & J. Spiess, Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 
(2017); Susan Athey, The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2018); Aguirregabiria et al., supra note 75, at 52–56; 
Iskhakov, Fedor, John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, Machine learning and structural econometrics: contrasts 
and synergies, 23 THE ECONOMETRICS JOURNAL 81 (2020). 
77 For reasons to be cautious about how much to expect machine learning can achieve in the economic 
analysis of competition, see Aguirregabiria et al., supra note 75, at 52-56. 
78 With sufficient data, of course, even the behavior of long-established lines of businesses can be 
illuminated with machine learning. See, e.g., Tianyi Wang et al., A Framework for Airfare Price Prediction: 
A Machine Learning Approach, 25TH EUROPEAN SIGNAL PROCESSING CONFERENCE (2017). 
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Nevertheless, assuming data availability, machine learning does promise to be 
helpful for identifying patterns that deserve greater antitrust scrutiny.79 Firms themselves 
are said to find these algorithms useful as part of to support their own internal compliance 
management systems.80 Machine-learning algorithms may be especially useful for public 
regulators in monitoring for anticompetitive behaviors and outcomes in newer, data-rich 
markets where existing economic theory remains limited—a category of business that 
seems only destined to grow larger in the years ahead.81 Machine learning is also likely to 
facilitate improvements in antitrust regulators’ decision-making about how to target scarce 
resources for enforcement investigation.82  
In an increasingly complex, dynamic market environment, antitrust authorities need 
better ways to identify problems and problematic behavior by firms. Even when machine-
learning tools cannot by themselves support authoritative judgments of market 
concentration or anticompetitive behavior, they are likely to be able to help regulators 
determine where to look more closely by identifying anomalies in pricing or other market 
behavior, or by relying on various proxies to forecast likely perpetrators of collusive 
conduct.83  Overall, market imperatives and technological capabilities increasingly will 
point antitrust authorities toward greater reliance on the use of machine-learning algorithms 
to carry out their missions. 
 
III. ANTITRUST BY ALGORITHM’S INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
Initial exploration of the use of algorithmic tools is currently possible for many 
antitrust authorities, and some competition bodies are already starting to make incremental 
moves to enhance their reliance on computational technology.84 It is thus no longer difficult 
to imagine a qualitatively distinct future in which antitrust regulators, as with regulators 
more generally, come to rely much more extensively on machine learning to automate tasks 
 
79 Deng, supra note 68, at 84 (discussing how AI tools “might be used to deter and prevent cartel 
formation”). 
80 Sabine Zigelski & Lynn Robertson, What Can Make Competition Compliance Programmes Really 
Effective?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Nov. 2021) (“Algorithms can support businesses in their monitoring, 
prevention and detection efforts, which can benefit from widely available know-how on screening for anti-
competitive behaviours.”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMMES 40 (2021), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-compliance-programmes-
2021.pdf (“In addition to structural, price or performance based screens, companies can use Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) to monitor company communication for suspicious signs, such as keywords in competitor 
communication, which can lead to an early flagging of potentially problematic behaviour.”). See also Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Minor, Remarks at the 6th Annual Government Enforcement Institute 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-matthew-s-miner-
delivers-remarks-6th-annual-government (noting that in the enforcement setting prosecutors in financial 
cases will ask “about what the company has done to analyze or track its own data resources”). 
81 Cf. Massarotto, supra note 45. 
82 See, e.g., Nicholls, supra note 32; Giovanna Massarotto & Ashwin Ittoo, Gleaning Insight from 
Antitrust Cases Using Machine Learning, 1 STAN. COMPUTATIONAL ANTITRUST 16 (2021); Martin Huber & 
David Imhof, Machine Learning with Screens for Detecting Bid-Rigging Cartels, 65 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
277 (2019). 
83 Joseph Harrington, Detecting Cartels, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 213, 252 (2006) 
(suggesting value in finding “new empirical methods for picking up structural change and statistical 
anomalies . . . for identifying markets worthy of closer scrutiny”). 
84 Massarotto & Ittoo, supra note 82. 
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and functions currently handled by humans.85 Indeed, for the reasons we have outlined, it 
seems apparent that moving toward substantial reliance on artificial intelligence to oversee 
market behavior—that is, toward antitrust by algorithm—will be a sensible strategy if 
authorities are to fulfill antitrust’s goals in a marketplace driven itself by algorithms. But 
making significant changes to reorganize and reconceive antitrust oversight in an 
algorithmic era will not be easy. As we have noted, antitrust authorities may well need to 
be give new legislative authorities and the substantive nature of antitrust law may need to 
be rewritten to some degree.86 Regardless of any substantive changes to the law, antitrust 
bodies will also need the leadership vision and resources to overcome a series of 
institutional challenges in making a transition to antitrust by algorithm. 
As much as the rationale for antitrust authorities’ pursuit of machine learning can 
be readily understood in general terms given changes in market dynamics, the managers of 
antitrust authorities will need to make a series of concrete decisions about exactly when 
and for what purposes to use specific kinds of algorithmic tools, as well as how those tools 
should be designed and deployed. In making these decisions, managers should obviously 
focus in the first instance on whether the use of algorithmic tools will improve their 
organizations’ performance in terms of fulfilling their market oversight missions. 
Especially if automated tools are to replace humans in the performance of certain tasks or 
functions, the guiding question should be whether the digital algorithms can perform better 
than trained humans—with “better” operationalized in terms of outcomes specified by the 
antitrust organization’s leaders, including increased accuracy and speed in spotting 
collusion or other rent-seeking behavior.87  
A variety of factors will affect machine-learning algorithms’ performance at tasks 
within antitrust organizations. Some factors are inherent in how algorithms function: they 
require large volumes of reliable and relevant data along with well-specified, 
mathematically stated goals.88 If these inherent preconditions for using algorithmic tools 
cannot be met, then antitrust authorities will not be able to deploy them to their advantage. 
For example, in situations where market conditions are rapidly changing, it will be 
imperative for the antitrust regulator to have a steady supply of current data, or else the 
algorithm will suffer from “brittleness,” or external validity problems.89 To be useful, 
disparate data sources will also need to be capable of being linked together via matching 
entity identifiers.90 
In noting the need for data, we do not mean to suggest that the amount of—or even 
the currency of—data available to antitrust authorities will be an exogenous condition out 
 
85 Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 55. 
86 See supra Part II. 
87 Coglianese & Lai, supra note 61. 
88 For discussion of the importance of goal precision in the context of the analysis of mergers, see 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Micro-Directives and Computational Merger Review, 1 STAN. J. 
COMPUTATIONAL ANTITRUST 132 (2021). See generally Cary Coglianese, Algorithmic Regulation: Machine 
Learning as a Governance Tool, in MARC SCHUILENBURG & RIK PEETERS, EDS., THE ALGORITHMIC SOCIETY: 
TECHNOLOGY, POWER, AND KNOWLEDGE 35, 47-49 (2021). 
89 Of course, it bears noting that if conditions are indeed rapidly changing, then relying on traditional 
tools may well be even more brittle, with machine learning still performing comparatively better. 
90 See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 55, at 1165-66.  For a helpful discussion of the characteristics of 
data that will support antitrust by algorithm, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to 
Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339 (2017). 
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of an antitrust authority’s control. On the contrary, data availability, like other resources, 
may be adjustable and will be just one of the institutional challenges that authorities will 
face in shifting toward an era of antitrust by algorithm.91 Overall, authorities will need to 
address three type of institutional challenges which we identify in this final part of this 
paper: (a) building their organizations’ capacities to make effective and responsible use of 
advances in predictive analytics; (b) avoiding legal pitfalls and challenges to governmental 
reliance on artificial intelligence; and (c) ensuring public confidence and trust in their use 
of algorithmic tools. These institutional challenges are interconnected. Antitrust authorities 
will need to build sufficient organizational capacity if they are to use artificial intelligence 
tools responsibly, which will help in building trust and overcoming any legal challenges. 
 
A. Building Organizational Capacity 
 
Data availability will be the first organizational capacity hurdle that antitrust 
authorities must overcome. If antitrust by algorithm is justified by the rapid pace of market 
activity—including activity driven itself by private actors’ use of algorithms—then 
antitrust regulators will almost surely need data access at a speed that mirrors the market 
activity the regulators are seeking to oversee. To obtain this access, antitrust officials could 
insist on including real-time sharing of digital data on a case-by-case basis as part of the 
settlement agreements they negotiate in enforcement actions taken against firms.92 More 
generally, some firms might be persuaded to provide such data access voluntarily on a 
regular basis.93 But perhaps more likely, legislatures or antitrust agencies will need to 
establish legal requirements for data-sharing to ensure that all firms provide necessary data 
access to antitrust authorities.94 
Access to necessary data, though, is only part of the overall capacity needed by 
antitrust organizations if they are to transform significantly in their reliance on artificial 
intelligence. Organizations also need hardware and cloud computing capacity to store and 
analyze these massive quantities of data. Although the dramatic advances in computing 
power in recent decades are precisely what have made the machine-learning revolution 
feasible, it nevertheless remains that many governmental IT systems are older, even 
antiquated.95 Moreover, governments not only need up-to-date hardware for data storage 
 
91  See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, & Edward A. Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004). 
92 Harrington, supra note 83, at 252. 
93 Cf. Coglianese, Zeckhauser & Parson, supra note 91.  
94 Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos & Marshall Van Alstyne, Digital Platforms and Antitrust 
(Working Paper, Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/WP-2020-06-1.pdf; 
Schrepel, supra note 1, at 6. Because many of the most significant businesses subject to antitrust scrutiny in 
the years ahead will have a transnational scope, international regulatory cooperation and even data-sharing 
will also be important. Regulators should also be mindful, of course, of what might be considered a regulatory 
“Hawthorne effect”—namely, that once private firms know that government is collecting and analyzing their 
data, their incentives to continue to collect that data in the same way will change. See Niva lkin-Koren & 
Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-by-Data on Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2019). 
95  DONALD F. KETTL, ESCAPING JURASSIC GOVERNMENT: HOW TO RECOVER AMERICA’S LOST 
COMMITMENT TO COMPETENCE (2016); Jack Moore, The Crisis in Federal IT that’s Scarier than Y2K Ever 
Was, NEXTGOV (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/11/crisis-federal-it-rivals-
y2k/123908/; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging Legacy 
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and analysis; they also need to invest in the technologies and operational procedures 
required for robust privacy and cybersecurity protection of all the data they use.96 Here, 
too, governments’ current capacity has generally been lacking, with vulnerabilities that 
antitrust authorities will need to guard against in their data operations.97  
Antitrust authorities will need adequate human capital and expertise as well.98 Even 
though machine learning is usually referred to as artificial intelligence, self-learning 
algorithms still depend vitally on humans to program and structure them, as well as to train, 
test, validate, and refine them.99 Antitrust authorities—which already do have staffs of 
economists and other analysts—will need to ensure that these analytic personnel also 
possess the latest data science skills as well as exhibit appropriate sensitivity to legal and 
ethical issues presented by governmental use of artificial intelligence. Their personnel may 
well benefit from working with other antitrust authorities around the world and sharing 
lessons learned in the use of antitrust by algorithm. 
It will, of course, always be challenging to build or maintain an in-house workforce 
with cutting-edge analytic skills, as public sector organizations face inherent competitive 
disadvantages vis-à-vis the private sector when it comes to recruiting expertise.100 In some 
cases, antitrust authorities may find that they will need to rely on private contractors and 
consulting firms to provide necessary human capital to support algorithmic antitrust tools. 
But when they do, they should ensure that their procurement contracts protect the authority 
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ransomware.html; Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the U.S. Government, WIRED 
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and ensure sufficient access to information that may need to be disclosed in litigation or in 
response to other public oversight demands.101 
 
B. Avoiding Legal Pitfalls 
 
Outside of the antitrust context, legal conflicts and public controversies over 
governmental use of algorithmic tools have already arisen.102 Antitrust authorities should 
prepare for some of the same disputes whenever they make a largescale shift to relying on 
algorithmic tools. The range of legal issues that antitrust by algorithm will implicate 
parallel those that arise with administrative use of machine learning more generally: 
accountability, transparency, equality, privacy, and due process. 103  Although antitrust 
authorities, like other governmental entities, will likely often enjoy a practical, if not legal, 
advantage in court, their prospects of prevailing in court will depend on the law in the 
specific jurisdictions in which they reside, the particularities of their use of machine-
learning algorithms, and the performance of specific algorithmic tools.104 
But to generalize: When these tools are used to support discretionary actions—for 
example, general background research—algorithms will pose the least amount of legal risk 
for antitrust regulators. Similarly, when machine learning is used simply to identify 
potential firms to target for human follow-up and investigation, these uses as well are likely 
to be escape judicial interference, especially when human-gathered and human-analyzed 
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evidence forms the actual basis for any subsequently imposed enforcement penalties.105 
Perhaps for this same reason, wherever machine-learning algorithms are used merely to 
supplement, rather than replace, any kind of human decision-making by antitrust officials, 
they will likely be less susceptible to reversal by the courts.106 
Transparency and due process considerations are nevertheless likely to loom large 
in any cases challenging antitrust by algorithm. Machine-learning algorithms can achieve 
highly accurate forecasts but it is not easy for humans to understand or intuitively explain 
how these algorithms reach their predictions.107 These algorithms also typically do not 
directly support causal or correlative claims—that is, conclusions that businesses with 
certain characteristics or behaviors are more likely to engage in anticompetitive 
behavior. 108  Nevertheless, in some countries it may be legally sufficient for antitrust 
authorities to release only relatively limited information about their algorithms—such as 
just the objective functions and general structures—or even to be exempt altogether from 
disclosing any information if the algorithms are used for law enforcement purposes.109 But 
even in these jurisdictions, the law may change, as it has in some countries to date. Under 
the 2016 European General Data Protection Regulation, for example, businesses that are 
subjected to algorithmic tools deployed by antitrust authorities will enjoy at least some 
right to an explanation of how these algorithms work.110 
Furthermore, some of the same concerns that stand behind calls for consumer 
protection regulation of artificial intelligence in the private sector may apply whenever the 
government uses algorithms for consequential purposes. If antitrust or consumer protection 
agencies demand disclosure of information related to private firms’ use of algorithms, they 
might reasonably expect that the public will demand similar disclosures of their own use 
of algorithms. It is unsurprising, for example, that the European Commission’s 2021 
proposal for AI regulation would apply to both private and public sector uses of artificial 
intelligence.111 
Antitrust regulators may also face legal challenges related to algorithmic bias, 
especially should their own algorithms lead to outcomes that unfairly impose 
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disproportionate impacts on businesses owned by women or members of certain racial or 
religious groups.112 The potential for algorithmic bias has given rise to a considerable 
source of legal and public concern in other contexts, especially when machine-learning 
algorithms are trained on data that are already infused with human biases.113 Such concern 
is most palpable with algorithms trained on general law enforcement data, because crime 
data are infused with historical, human-created biases.114 In addition, algorithmic bias is 
also a particular concern in settings where individuals rather than organizations are directly 
affected or targeted by algorithms.115 For these reasons, algorithmic bias may seem, at least 
at first glance, less of a concern with the algorithmic tools likely to be used by antitrust 
authorities.116 Nevertheless, given the importance and salience of concerns of algorithmic 
bias, it would be prudent for antitrust analysts and decision-makers to address these 
concerns when pursuing antitrust by algorithm.117 
 
C. Ensuring Public Trust 
 
Antitrust by algorithm’s very promise for advancing the goals of competition law 
in a dynamic market environment makes it important for antitrust regulators to exercise 
prudence as they move forward with greater reliance on algorithmic tools. Although 
antitrust law and its administration might have once seemed largely a technical regulatory 
domain of interest to a specialized group of lawyers, economists, and academics, today the 
field of antitrust is much more publicly salient and contested than it has been for decades.118 
When increased public interest in antitrust law is paired with the existence of palpable 
public concerns about the fairness and transparency of artificial intelligence,119 it is clear 
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that regulators’ overarching approach to antitrust by algorithm must be thoughtfully 
executed with appropriate validation, transparency, and public consultation. If 
governmental efforts to pursue computational antitrust are too hastily pursued—or are 
mismanaged or inadequately overseen—unintended problems or controversy may set back 
progress in the responsible and effective deployment of computational antitrust.120  
In developing and relying on algorithmic tools, antitrust authorities should also 
account for emerging principles and best practices for public sector entities’ responsible 
use of artificial intelligence. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has noted, “[t]he use of AI in the public sector present challenges, 
as public administrations must ensure a high standard of transparency and accountability 
for their actions, especially those that directly impact individuals.”121  The OECD has 
adopted principles for the responsible use of artificial intelligence that, among other things, 
call upon government officials to “commit to transparency and responsible disclosure 
regarding AI systems” and “to enable those affected by an AI system to understand the 
outcome” that it generates and challenge any adverse decisions that result from its use.122 
Similar recommendations and guidance have been offered around the world in recent years 
by governmental authorities, industry groups, and nongovernmental standard-setting 
bodies.123 
In moving toward antitrust by algorithm, government officials should begin by 
engaging in their own basic decision analysis before launching into the design and 
development of a tool or system that relies on machine-learning analysis. 124  Most 
importantly, they should focus on whether a contemplated system or tool would likely 
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improve their oversight of industry.125 In other words, they should ask: What might be 
some of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks associated with a proposed AI 
system or tool?126 It will almost certainly be prudent for antitrust authorities to start off 
small, gaining experience with such tools on uses with lower stakes before attempting to 
apply them to matters of high stakes. 
Algorithmic impact assessments and algorithmic auditing are increasingly 
considered to be best practices in both private and public sector deployment of artificial 
intelligence and they should likewise become part of antitrust regulators’ internal processes 
for deciding to design and deploy algorithms. 127  These processes should include 
documented efforts to verify that the algorithms are working as designed and to validate 
that they are achieving in practice the goals established for them. In setting goals and 
validating an algorithm’s performance against these goals, government officials may find 
it useful to consult with members of the public to provide transparency about their plans.128 
Public engagement surrounding algorithmic design can help government officials 
anticipate undesirable consequences and avoid unduly narrow thinking.129  Even when 
authorities use algorithmic tools for law enforcement purposes that counsel against 
extensive transparency and public consultation, it is still possible for officials to ensure 
robust internal review processes, establish expert peer reviews under confidentiality 
agreements, and even disclose certain general information to the public.130  
By adhering to best practices throughout all stages of the design and deployment of 
algorithmic tools and systems, antitrust authorities can more likely ensure that they can 
reap the advantages that come from these tools and systems while also maintaining the 
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trust of the business community and the broader public. 131  In other words, moving 
responsibly toward antitrust by algorithm will necessitate more than just making 
technological advances. It will require meeting the institutional challenges involve building 
the right kind of human expertise, ethical practices, and organizational processes. Meeting 
these challenges should also help reduce any legal risks that antitrust agencies may find 




The digital technologies transforming private markets present daunting challenges 
for all regulators. But perhaps nowhere more than in the realm of antitrust do the rapid 
changes created by digital platforms, dynamic pricing algorithms, and other new 
technologies present a more direct challenge to governmental performance. Today’s 
technological advances are leading to markets rife with possibilities for increasingly subtle 
and evasive forms of anticompetitive behavior by private firms. If antitrust authorities 
simply maintain their operational and analytic status quo, they are likely to be left behind 
by private sector innovation and fail to fulfill their public mandates. 
But just as technological advances present new problems for antitrust authorities, 
they also present potential new solutions that can assist antitrust regulators in identifying 
and addressing anticompetitive behavior. To implement these new machine-learning 
solutions with success, antitrust authorities must build up their organizational capacity 
to deploy algorithms effectively and responsibly. An increasing shift to the algorithmic  
administration of antitrust law and policy will not be easy and may pose some risk of new 
legal challenges. But with thoughtful design and development, along with appropriate 
transparency and public engagement, antitrust authorities should be able to build public 
confidence in, and withstand judicial scrutiny of, their use of “antitrust by algorithm.” 
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